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Abstract—  Many Organizations are moving to web-based 
approaches to computing.  As the threat evolves to higher 
levels of sophistication, many governmental and commercial 
organizations are also moving toward high assurance.  This 
paper describes an approach that uses strong bi-lateral end-to-
end authentication with end-point encryption and with SAML-
based authorization using OASIS Security Standards.  This 
service-based approach offers many of the advantages of the 
cloud-based approaches.  Cloud-based approaches allow for 
more agile scale-up, while maintain a low marginal cost of 
accommodating increased users.  However, many of the 
applications require high assurance, attribution, formal access 
control processes, and a wide range of threat mitigation 
procedures for many of the industries (banking, credit, content 
distribution, etc.) that are considering conversion to cloud 
computing environments. Current implementations of cloud 
services do not meet these high assurance requirements.  This 
high assurance requirement presents many challenges to 
normal computing and some rather precise requirements that 
have developed from high assurance issues for web service 
applications. The  most difficult part of scaling up to higher 
user levels is the maintenance of the security paradigms that 
provide mitigation of these generic and specific threats. 
 
Index Terms—  Authentication, Authorization, Attribution, 
Public Key Infrastructure, Security Assertion Markup 
Language (SAML) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
n certain enterprises, the network is continually under 
attack.  Examples might be: 
•  Banking industry enterprise such as a clearing 
house for electronic transactions,  
•  Defense industry applications,  
•  Credit card consolidation processes that handle 
sensitive data, both fiscal and personal, 
•  Medical with concerns for privacy and statutory 
requirements, 
•  Content distributors worried about rights in data, or 
theft of content. 
The attacks have been pervasive and continue to the point 
that nefarious code may be present, even when regular 
monitoring and system sweeps clean up readily apparent 
malware.  This omnipresent threat leads to a healthy 
paranoia of resistance to observation, intercept, and 
masquerading.  Despite this attack environment, the web 
interface is the best way to provide access to many of the 
enterprise  users.  One way to continue operating in this 
environment is to not only know and vet your users, but also 
your software and devices.    
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Even that has limitations when dealing with the 
voluminous threat environment.  Today we regularly 
construct seamless encrypted communications between 
machines through SSL or other TLS.    These do not cover 
the “last mile” between the machine and the user (or 
service) on one end, and the machine and the service on the 
other end.  This last mile is particularly important when we 
assume that malware may exist on either machine, opening 
the transactions to exploits for eavesdropping, ex-filtration, 
session high-jacking, data corruption, man-in-the-middle, 
masquerade, blocking or termination of service, and other 
nefarious behaviors.   Before we examine the challenges of 
cloud computing systems, let us first examine what high 
assurance architecture might look like.   
II. TENETS FOR HIGH ASSURANCE COMPUTING 
This section provides nine tenets that guide decisions in 
an architectural formulation for high assurance and 
implementation approaches [1].  These tenets are separate 
from the “functional requirements” of a specific component 
(e.g., a name needs to be unique); they relate more to the 
goals of the solution that guide its implementation. 
• The zeroth tenet is that the malicious entities can look at 
all network traffic and send virus software to network assets.  
In other words, rogue agents (including insider threats) may 
be present and to the extent possible, we should be able to 
operate  and, in  their presence, although this does not 
exclude their ability to view some activity.  Assets are 
constantly monitored and cleaned; however,  new attacks 
may be successful at any time and nefarious code may be 
present at any given time. 
• The first tenet is simplicity.  This seems obvious, but it is 
notable how often this principle is ignored in the quest to 
design solutions with more and more features. That being 
said, there is a level of complexity that must be handled for 
security  purposes and implementations should not overly 
simplify the problem for simplicity’s sake. 
• The  second  tenet, and closely related to the first is 
extensibility.  Any construct we put in place for an enclave 
should be extensible to the domain and the enterprise, and 
ultimately to cross-enterprise and coalition.  It is undesirable 
to work a point solution or custom approach for any of these 
levels. 
• The  third  tenet is information  hiding.  Essentially, 
information hiding involves only revealing the minimum set 
of information to the outside world needed for making 
effective, authorized use of a capability.  It also involves 
implementation and process hiding so that this information 
cannot be farmed for information or used for mischief.   
• The  fourth  tenet is  accountability.  In this context, 
accountability means being able to unambiguously identify 
and track what active entity in the enterprise performed any 
particular operation (e.g.,  accessed a file or IP  address, 
invoked a service).  Active entities include people, 
machines, and software process, all of which are named 
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attribution with supporting evidence.  Without a delegation 
model, and detailed logging, it is impossible to establish a 
chain of custody or do effective forensic analysis to 
investigate security incidents.    
• The fifth tenet is minimal detail (to only add detail to the 
solution to the required level). This combines the principles 
of simplicity and information  hiding, and preserves 
flexibility of implementation at lower levels.  For example, 
adding too much detail to the access solution while all of the 
other IA components are still being elaborated may result in 
wasted work when the solution has to be adapted or 
retrofitted later. 
• The sixth tenet is the emphasis on a service-driven rather 
than a product-driven solution whenever possible.  Using 
services makes possible the flexibility, modularity, and 
composition of more powerful capabilities.  Product-driven 
solutions tend to be more closely tied to specific vendors 
and proprietary products.  That said, commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) products that are as open as possible will be 
emphasized and should produce cost efficiencies.   
Procurement specifications should require functionality and 
compatibility in lieu of requiring operations in a Microsoft 
forest [2] environment.  
• The  seventh  tenet is that lines of authority  should be 
preserved and IA decisions should be made by policy and/or 
agreement at the appropriate level. 
• The eighth tenet is need-to-share as overriding the need-
to-know.  Health, defense, and finance applications often 
rely upon and are ineffective without shared information. 
A.  Architectural Features 
Building an architecture that conforms to these tenets 
requires specific elements to ensure the tenets are built into 
systems.  In the architecture we espouse, the basic 
formulation follows a web 2.0 approach and uses 
Organization for the Advancement of Structured 
Information Standards (OASIS)  standards of security [4].   
These elements are listed below: 
Naming and Identity 
Identity will be established by the requesting agency.  All 
recognized certificate authorities  naming scheme must  be 
honored.  To avoid collision amongst the schemes, the 
identity used by all federated exchanges shall be  the 
distinguished name as it appears on the primary credential 
provided by the certificate authority.    The distinguished 
name must be unique over time and space, which means that 
retired names are not reused and ambiguities are eliminated.   
Naming must be applied to all active entities (persons, 
machines, and software). 
Credentials 
Credentials are an integral part of the federation schema.  
Each identity (all active entities) requiring access shall be 
credentialed by a trusted credentialing authority.  Further, a 
Security Token Server (STS) must be used for storing 
attributes associated with access control.  The STS that will 
be used for generating Security Assertion Markup language 
(SAML) tokens must also be credentialed (primarily through 
the same credentialing authority, although others may be 
entertained). 
PKI required – X.509 Certificates 
The primary exchange medium for setting up 
authentication of identities and setting up cryptographic 
flows is the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) embodied in an 
X.509 certificate. 
Certificate Services 
The certificate authority must use known and registered 
(or in specific cases defined) certificate revocation and 
currency-checking software. 
Bi-Lateral End-to-End Authentication 
The requestor will not only authenticate to the service 
(not the server), but the service will authenticate to the 
requestor.  This two-way authentication avoids a number of 
threat vulnerabilities.  The requestor will initially 
authenticate to the server and set up a Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL) connection to begin communication with the service.  
The primary method of authentication will be through the 
use of public keys in the X.509 certificate, which can then 
be used to set up encrypted communications  (either by 
X.509 keys or a generated session key).  The preferred 
method of communication is secure messaging, contained in 
Simple Object Access Profile (SOAP) envelopes.  All 
messages are encrypted for delivering to the recipient of the 
message. 
Authorization Using SAML Packages 
All authorizations will be through the use of SAML 
packages in accordance with the SAML 2.0 specification 
provided by OASIS [3-7]. 
Registration of the STS 
All STS that create and sign SAML packages must be 
registered.  The certificate of the STS will be used to sign 
SAML tokens, and complete bi-lateral authentication 
between requestors and the STS. 
Recognizing STS Signatures  
STS signatures will be recognized only for registered 
STSs and may be repackaged by the local STS when such 
registration has been accomplished.  Unrecognized 
signatures will not be honored and the refusal will be logged 
as a security relevant event. 
Certificate Caches 
Local STSs within the enterprise forests will maintain a 
certificate cache of all registered STSs to facilitate the re-
issuance of SAML packages when appropriate. 
III. HIGH ASSURANCE ARCHITECTURE ELEMENTS 
Despite the obvious advantages of cloud computing, the 
large amount of virtualization and redirection poses a 
number of problems for high assurance.  In order to 
understand this, let’s examine a security flow in a high 
assurance system. 
The basic elements include a user, who initially 
authenticates to his/her domain using a hardware token and 
establishes a Virtual Private Network (VPN) session; a 
Security Token Server (STS), in this case the Identity 
Provider (IdP); and attribute stores for generating the 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) token. 
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Fig. 1.  High Assurance Security Flows  
 
The application system consists of a web application (for 
communication with the user), one or more  aggregation 
services that invoke  one or more exposure services and 
combine their information for return to the web application 
and the user. As a prerequisite to end-to-end communication 
an SSL or other suitable TLS is set  up between each 
communication  of the machines.  The exposure services 
retrieve information from one or more Authoritative Data 
Sources (ADSs).  Each communication link in Fig. 1 will be 
authenticated end- to-end with the use of public keys in the 
X.509 certificates provided for each of the active entities.  
 
This two-way authentication avoids a number of threat 
vulnerabilities. The requestor initially authenticates to the 
service provider. Once the  authentication is completed, a 
TLS/SSL connection is established between the requestor 
and the service provider, within which a WS-Security 
package will be sent to the service. The WS-Security 
package contains a SAML token generated by the Security 
Token Server (STS) in the requestor domain. The primary 
method of authentication will be through the use of public 
keys in the X.509 certificate, which can then be used to set 
up encrypted communications  (either by X.509 keys or a 
generated session key). Session keys and certificate keys 
need to be robust and sufficiently protected to prevent 
malware exploitation. The preferred method of 
communication is secure messaging using WS Security, 
contained in SOAP envelopes.  The encryption key used is 
the public key of the target (or a mutually derived session 
key), ensuring only the target can interpret  the 
communication. 
 
The problem of scale-up and performance is the issue that 
makes cloud environments so attractive.  The cloud will 
bring on assets as needed and retire them as needed.  The 
trick is to maintain the security paradigm as we scale up.   
 
A traffic cop (load balancer) monitors activity and posts a 
connection to an available instance.  In this case all works 
out since the new instance has a unique name, end-point, 
and credentials with which to proceed.  All of this, of course 
needs to be logged in a standard form and parameters 
passed to make it easy to reconstruct for forensics.   We 
have shown a  couple of threats that need mitigation 
where one eavesdrops on the communication and may 
actually try to insert himself into the conversation (man-
in-the-middle).  This highlights the importance of bi-
lateral authentication and encrypted communications.   
The  second  highlights the need to protect caches and 
memory spaces. 
IV.  PROVISIONING OF APPLICATIONS 
In order to make the first communication to a home 
page in the service environment, we will assume a web 
application (Enterprise Services Homepage [ESHP]) or a 
device application (Enterprise Application Store 
[EAPPS]) that can provide the user links to appropriate 
services.  These links are complex in that they must 
contain the Request for SAML Token (RST), the URI of 
the IdP, and the URI of the target application.  The first link 
to the ESHP will be provided as a widget on the Enterprise 
Standard desktop.  This ESHP or EAPPS will bilaterally 
authenticate with the user and consume the user’s SAML in 
order to provide the user an appropriate list of services. 
 
Fig. 2.  Enterprise Services Home Page  
 
The initial web application will contain all of the 
information necessary to provide this to the user.  To do so, 
the web application must have access to or contain a registry 
with the following information: 
• An enumerated list of Authorized SAML Producers 
 Includes Public Key (for SAML consumption) 
  Includes URI of the SAML Producer (IdP) 
• An enumerated list of web applications 
  Unique name of each application, or Traffic 
Handling Web Application (see discussion below) 
  The end point URI for accessing the applications or 
Traffic Handling Web Application (see discussion 
below) 
  A description of the service 
  The Access Control List (ACL) for the Service 
  The URI of the IdP for the user 
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used to eliminate 
services for which the 
user does not have 
authorization.  This is 
done by matching the 
unfiltered SAML 
elements to the ACL in 
the last bullet.  A match 
must occur (or the ACL 
is none) in order for the 
ESHP or EAPPS to 
provide a link to the 
service.  When the 
match occurs, the ESHP 
will add the name, 
descriptive material, 
and the complex URI 
link to the home page.   
Fig. 3.  Enterprise Application Store  
 
All registered services are examined and when the list is 
compiled, the home page is sent to the user.  A notional 
homepage is provided in figure 2. A notional device display 
for the EAS is presented in figure 3.  The desktop or device 
icons must necessarily expire after a time period (say three 
months) to provide security against changes in status or 
privilege.  When a change occurs, the authorization will fail, 
but the expiring of the icon will clean up the displays on the 
desktop or device. 
 
Selecting an icon will invoke a link that will send an RST 
and a compound URI to the IdP for processing and connect 
the user with the end-point for bi-lateral authentication with 
a SAML token at the application.  If the SAML is 
acceptable, a session is started between the user and the web 
application. 
V. HIGH ASSURANCE ARCHITECTURE SCALE-UP 
Scale-up to higher levels of users will require a number of 
different schemes.  The most critical, since it involves every 
request, will be the STS.  Example data needed for load-
balancing calculations are provided below: 
•  Test data are still being developed; however, assume 
testing indicates 100 token requests can be satisfied in 
1 second by the current STS (IdP). 
  Improved versions of the STS or processors may 
reduce these requirements 
•  Initial operational deployment 
  Requirement for 4 SAML tokens per second  [1,000 
users in 5 minutes] 
  Need 1 STS (IdP) 
•  Six months after initial operational deployment: 
  Requirement for 34 SAML tokens per second 
[10,000 users in 5 minutes] 
  Need 1 STS (IdP) 
•  One year after initial operational deployment: 
  Requirement for 334 SAML tokens per second 
[100,000 users in 5 minutes ] 
  Need  5 STS (IdP)  cluster –  assumes a 20% 
throughput loss in clustering 
•  Two years after initial operational deployment: 
  Requirement  for 1667 SAML tokens per second 
[500,000 users in 5 minutes] 
  Need 23 STS (IdP) – assumes a 25% throughput loss 
in multiple clustering. 
Note that the STS is a trusted component and can be load 
balanced in the traditional manner, as shown in Figure 4.   
 
In this configuration, the clusters share the same naming, 
PKI credentials and end-point identities.  This is the only 
exception to the requirements for uniquely naming, PKI 
credentials, and end-points because the STS is the primary 
trusted component in the system.  The need for load 
balancing of the SP is not anticipated at this time, since it is 
used for occasional SAML verification or SAML rewriting 
in the case of federation. 
 
The second most likely element to need scale-up is the 
ESHP.  This one is a bit trickier.  Schemas that essentially 
extend the thread capabilities of the application may be 
employed.  When the capacities of the thread architecture 
are exhausted and independent instance of the application 
need to be set up, the process requires care.  The application 
or service is not a trusted element and is not exempt from 
the requirements for unique naming, credentialing, and end-
points.  Each independent instance must have its own name, 
URI, and credentials.   
 
Fig. 4.  STS Load Balancing  
 
Further, each independent instance must be provisioned 
for in the attribute stores if it will make further service calls.  
Fortunately, all web applications and services can be 
handled in the same manner and the process is not 
dependent on the number of instances needed to handle the 
user request.  A specific (x, where x corresponds to the web 
application or web service that needs balancing) Instance 
Availability Service (IASx) is set up as the end point for a 
request that needs to be load balanced.  Note that this means 
that the end-point in the ESHP must be changed to the 
specific IASx, and the end-point in the widget for the ESHP 
must be changed to the IAS for the ESHP.  The IASx needs 
to have the following information available: 
•  Number of independent instances of the web 
application 
•  Unique name of each independent instance of the 
web application 
Enterprise Payroll 
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the web application 
•  (OPTIONALLY) Usage and load data for each of 
the independent instances of the web application 
 
The user goes to the IdP with the address of the IAS, 
which he can have stored in his favorites, or executes the 
link on the ESHP (or in the case of ESHP from the desktop 
widget).  The IdP then posts the SAML over HTTPS to the 
IAS.   The IAS doesn’t even need to read the SAML 
(authentication only, or identity-based access control), but 
would  repost the SAML over HTTPS to the independent 
instance it calculates.  It is then completely out of the way, 
just like the IdP is completely out of the way, and the user is 
in session with the instance of the web application.  This 
process is shown in Figure 5. 
 
Fig. 5.  High Assurance Load Balancing  
 
The IAS (traffic director) monitors activity and posts a 
connection to an available independent instance.  No 
communication with the user is required, much as the https 
interface to the IdP requires no communication with the 
user. The determination of an available connection can start 
simply (initially round robin) and become more 
sophisticated by monitoring activity at the independent 
instances and choosing the lowest activity instance (or even 
more sophisticated later by considering memory, CPU, and 
number of threads in each instance). In this case, all of the 
end-to-end processes work since the new independent 
instance has a unique name, end-point, and credentials with 
which to proceed.  All of this, of course, needs to be logged 
in a standard form and parameters passed to make it easy to 
reconstruct for forensics.    
 
Key management is complex and essential.  When a new 
instance is required,  it must be built and activated 
(credentials and properties in the attribute store, as well as 
end-point assignment).  When a current instance is retired, it 
must be disassembled, and de-activated (credentials and 
properties in the attribute store, as well as end-point 
assignment).  All of these activities must be logged in a 
standard format with reference values that make it easy to 
reassemble the chain of events for forensics.   
 
Rules for maintaining high assurance during scale-up:  
1.  Shared  Identities and credentials break the 
accountability paradigm.  
• Each independent instance of a machine or service must 
be uniquely named [8] and provided a PKI Certificate 
for authentication.  The Certificate must be activated 
while the virtual machine is in being, and de-activated 
when it is not, preventing hijacking of the certificate by 
nefarious activities.   
•  The naming and certificates must be pre-issued and 
self-  certification is not allowed. Each independent 
instance of a machine or service must have a unique end 
point.  This may take some manipulation through the 
load balancing process but is required by attribution 
and accountability.  This means that simple re-direct 
will not work.  The one exception is the IdP of the 
STS,  which is trusted software.  Extensions of the 
thread mechanism by assigning resources to the 
operating system may preserve this functionality.  The 
individual mechanism for virtualization will 
determine whether this can be accomplished. 
2.  Each independent instance of a service must have an 
account provisioned  with appropriate elements in an 
attribute store.  These must be pre-issued and linked to 
the unique name for each potential independent 
instance of a service.  This is required for SAML token 
issuance. 
3.  The importance of cryptography cannot be overstated, 
and all internal communications as well as external 
communications should be encrypted to the end point of 
the communication.  Memory and storage should also be 
encrypted to prevent theft of cached data and security 
parameters. 
4. Private keys must reside in Hardware Storage Modules 
(HSMs). The security of the Java software key store does 
not meet high assurance criteria.  Stand-up of an 
independent machine or service must link keys in HSM, 
and activate credentials pre-assigned to the service. 
• Stand-down of an independent machine service  must 
de-link keys in HSM, and de-activate credentials pre-
assigned to the service. 
• Key  management in this environment is a particular 
concern and a complete management schema including 
destruction of session keys must be developed.  
5. Proxies and re-directs break the end-to-end paradigm.   
• When end points must change, a re-posting of 
communication is the preferred method.  There must be 
true end-to-end communication with full attribution.   
This will mean that communication must be re-initiated 
from client to server when an instance is instantiated, 
and  it must have a unique end point, with unique 
credentials and cryptography capabilities. 
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reference values  that make it easy to reassemble the 
chain of events for forensics. 
VI.  SUMMARY 
We have reviewed the basic approaches to scale  up in 
high assurance computing environments.  Virtualization 
must be very carefully reviewed to ascertain if the security 
paradigm can be maintained.  Extensions of the thread 
mechanism by assigning resources to the operating system 
may preserve this functionality.  The individual mechanism 
for virtualization will determine whether this can be 
accomplished.  Notably the extensive use of virtualization 
and redirection is severe enough that many customers who 
need high assurance have moved away from the concept of 
cloud computing.  Figure 6 provides a summary of how a 
user addresses an individual web application in a scaled-up 
system.  This processes described in this paper are part of a 
broad-scale, high-assurance enterprise stand-up, including 
high-assurance specification, and current implementation.  
Other aspects of these enterprise processes are described in 
[9-14]. 
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Fig. 6.  Accessing a Web Application in a Scaled Up Environment  
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